Grundlag

september 20, 2009

Constitutional illusions in Swedish democracy

The Swedish constitution is unique in the Western world in that it contains stark differences between formal regulation and political reality. No other Western country has this many ”constitutional illusions”. They are important to know about, since Swedes may not be fully open about them. They may refer to form, but not be fully open about political realities.

The explanation to these constitutional illusions is simple. The Swedish constitution is a constitution written by and for the political elite, instead of by independent experts, and by and for the people. In other words, this is the type of constitution you get if politicians alone decide on form and content for a constitution.

In this article the most important constitutional illusions in Sweden are described.

1. Most of the Western democracies are based on 19 th century constitutionalism. The UK is an exception, without a written constitution. These are the two main types of systems. Sweden fits none of these two. Instead, Sweden has a constitutional charter of sorts, which is refererred to as ”descriptive” rather than normative, and as a ”guide-line” for legislators, rather than lex superior upheld by independent courts. Important parts of political life have also been left outside constitutional regulation. One example is the role of corporativist organisations. This was contemplated in 1974, but the apparent parallells to fascism deterred the politicians from describing and regulating this aspect of Swedish political life, in the final draft. This allows Sweden to, on the one hand, claim that there is a written constitution, and on the other, treat the same constitution as a moot point in everyday politics and in the courts. It also creates a constitution that gives a picture of Sweden as a more or less normal Western country, simply because important aspects of Swedish political life were left out of the constitution, for reasons of appearance.

2. According to the Swedish constitutional charter, all power rests with the parliament. In reality, members of parliament are highly dependent on the top-leadership of their political parties. There may be discent from the party-line, but it is very rare, and when it occurrs it is mostly in a form that does not alter the outcome of voting in parliament. This is why the Swedish parliament often is refered to as a ”transport company”. The real decisions are taken in the cabinet, or in negotiations between corporativist organisations, and are then verified post hoc by the parliament. The way this works is that party-leadership controls nominations. If you do not follow the party-line, you will most likely not be nominated in the next elections. There are furthermore unique trappings in the Swedish constitution that delegate substantial powers to the cabinet, powers that normally should belong to the legislators (chapter 8 in the constitution). This is perhaps the most blatant example of a have and have not. Formally, parliament has all power, but in reality it has almost none.

3. The Swedish constitution contains a list of human rights and freedoms. The social democrats did not originally want to include this list in the 1974 constitution. Their point of view was that human rights and freedoms were an obstacle to ”urgent social reforms”. In its time and context, this meant a gradual change of Swedish society towards so called ”functional socialism”. Capitalists would still own their property, but in reality that ownership would be a moot point. (In fact, another example of the systematic use of double standards in Swedish politics). The result was a compromise with the opposition, in which a list of rights was included, but at the same time a back door was opened that made it possible to override human rights by simple legislation. In other words, human rights seemed to be protected by the constitution, but in reality they could be violated overnight by a simple majority in parliament. This, in fact, led to another compromise later on, in which a 12 month delay for such legislation could be claimed by a 30% minority in the parliament. In the end, these rights also turned out to be a moot point in the courts, which meant that they were meaningless for ordinary citizens. See (4), below!

4. Sweden claims to have legal review, even more so than the U.K., which has almost no legal review for acts of parliament. Sweden has a constitutional clause, according to which civil servants and courts can disregard a government act, or an act of parliament, if it is in ”obvious” violation of the constitution. In 1978, the meaning of ”obvious” was interpreted by the parliament´s consitutional comittee. Their conclusion was that the parliament was infallible, and that the rule therefore hardly could apply. Sweden is also unique in that it has this same ”obvious” criteria for government acts that violate acts of parliament. For government acts, the U.K. has a clear form of legal review, and the courts regularly overturn such acts that violate acts of parliament. Sweden, furthermore, has a legal council that can review acts of parliament that have not yet been passed. However, this is not compulsory, and in 50% of cases with serious criticisms from this council, the law was passed anyway. The only real use of the verdicts of this council is therefore to embarass the government, if the opposition cares to do so. On the one hand, Sweden has legal review, on the other hand it has less so than any other comparable Western country, including the U.K.

5. We have already discussed the ways in which the rule of law is undermined in Sweden. Here we can note that the constitutional charter claims that the courts are fully independent. In reality, they are curtailed by the system of appointment and by legal doctrine. The main points in this legal doctrine are so called Scandinavian realism, combined with an interpretation based on the original political will, a so called teleological method. In other words, Swedish courts are instructed to disregard ethics and morals, and they are supposed to second-guess the original will of politicians, when they apply laws. In reality, they are also second-guessing the current will of the politicians. This moves the Swedish system beyond just rule by law, and into the realm of political dictates, rather than legislation. For this system to work, Sweden makes frequent use of very generally phrased legislation, that can be handled more or less gratuitously by the bureaucracy and the courts.

6. Sweden and Finland have a unique system of independent government agencies. In Sweden, government agencies are actually similar to the courts, in this regard. Ministers are not allowed to meddle in concrete issues. They can only guide policy with general written instructions. In reality, in Sweden, personal connections and the abuse of the power of appointment of general directors, turn agency integrity into a moot point. A government inquiry has even concluded that this is the way the system works in reality, and found no reason to change it. So, why is it not changed? The reason is that it fits a culture of lack of accountability. If something goes wrong, the minister can always blame the general director, and then fire him or her, instead of having to take the consequences. This is an almost perfect example of what happens when politicians determine the form and content of a country´s constitution, instead of experts and the people. Ministers in Sweden have all the powers of ministers in other countries, but none of their accountability.

7. Sweden claims to have a dual tradition of strong independence of local government and a highly centralised national government. Compared to the U.K., municipal government is indeed independent in Sweden, since it levies its own taxes (some 30% on regular incomes). The formal independence of the 250 or so Swedish municipalities is also stated in the constitutional charter. However, over 80% of municipal expenditure is a result of national laws, and in the mid 1990s, during Sweden´s economic hardships, the system showed its true countenace, when national government rendered municipal independence a moot point. Political scientists and legal scholars in Sweden have since debated the real meaning of the constitutional regulation of municipal independence in Sweden, and found that it is ”unclear” (statement by the legal council). Unclarity is a typical method of ruling. When matters are unclear they can only be resolved by the greater power, in this case central government. In this way, the Swedish constitution again turns out to be a moot point in real politics, and a tradition of municipal independence, that Swede´s may proudly mention to foreigners, in reality an illusion.

maj 5, 2009

Charta 2010

Om ett statsskick skall reformeras, bör reformerna bygga på en utvärdering av hur den nuvarande grundlagen har fungerat. Vilka politiska misslyckande eller allvarliga samhällsproblem har berott på brister i grundlagen?

Exempel på problem i det svenska samhället, vilka har anknytning till grundlagen är:

1. Bristande långsiktighet i det politiska beslutsfattandet, till exempel i skattepolitiken och i statliga regleringar av ekonomin

2. Det låga förtroendet för de som har den största makten: de politiska partierna, fackföreningarna och kommunalpolitiker

3. Statens bristande förmåga att leverera grundläggande tjänster (”soft state”), inte minst inom rättsväsendet.

4. Till arten och graden unika misslyckanden, såsom 90-tals krisen och sjukskrivningarna

5. En integrationspolitik som har lyckats sämre än i andra jämförbara länder

Enligt tidigare handlar demokrati om hur makten fördelas. Förklaringar till misslyckanden bör därför sökas i brister i hur makten fördelas i Sverige:

1. Makten ligger hos intresseorganisationer, istället för hos medborgarna eller deras valda ombud

2. För mycket makt har samlats på för få händer

3. Grundlagen saknar spärrar mot alltför snabba och radikala politiska förändringar

4. Kontrollmakten är för svagt utvecklad

5. Möjligheterna till ansvarsutkrävande är otillräckliga

6. Utnämningsmakten är politiskt korrumperad

Med denna beskrivning som grund kan följande reformer av den svenska grundlagen föreslås:

1. Återför makten till medborgarna:

- Valsystemet görs om till proportionerliga personval, istället för som idag, partival med personröst, vilket skulle göra folkförsamlingarna mer självständiga och mer ansvariga inför folket

- Fackföreningarnas nuvarande makt över normgivning och normtolkning tas bort, eftersom den utgör ett intrång på makt som endast bör tillkomma riksdagen och domstolarna

- Reglerna för finansiering av partier reformeras till europeisk standard, vilket skulle bryta fackets osunda inflytande över det socialdemokratiska partiet och bidra till att klargöra olika gruppers inflytande över statsmakten

- Statschefen, det vill säga monarken, ges motsvarande makt som i andra länder med konstitutionell monarki, vilket skulle öka kraven på regeringen att följa grundlagen och agera i landets intresse, till exempel vid utnämningar

- Ett moratorium på 10 år införs för den som vill bli ledamot av en folkförsamling, och har arbetat som tjänsteman inom offentlig förvaltning

- Utnämningsmakten reformeras i grunden

2. Skapa ett skydd mot alltför snabba eller radikala politiska förändringar:

- 30% av ledamöterna i en folkförsamling, eller 100 000 namnunderskrifter, skall kunna tvinga fram en folkomröstning om ett vilande lagförslag

- Rättsväsendet ges möjlighet till full lagprövning, samtidigt som grundlagen skrivs om för att uppfylla kraven på en normativ konstitution

- Rättssystemets och doktrinens, det vill säga rättsvetenskapens, självständighet säkras genom att reformera utnämningen av domare, åklagare och professorer i juridik

- Grundlagen får verklig status av grundlag, vilket innebär att det blir svårare att ändra den än idag, samt att folket måste ge sitt godkännande i en folkomröstning eller ett grundlagskonvent

3. Öka möjligheterna till ansvarsutkrävande:

- De statliga myndigheternas skenbara självständighet avskaffas, och ersätts med fullt ministeransvar av gänse slag i etablerade demokratier

- Lagar och regler för tjänstefel, åtal av tjänstemän och politiker, rätt att förhöra under ed, patienters rättigheter, skadeståndsanspråk gentemot myndigheter, m m, lyfts till europeisk nivå

- Separata valdagar införs för såväl kommun som landsting, där särskilt det demokratiska underskottet i landstingen behöver synliggöras

- Revisionen ses över, och då särskilt den kommunala revisionen, liksom möjligheter att lagföra kommuner som bryter mot domstolsbeslut

- Dualismen avskaffas, vilket innebär att internationella konventioner som sverige skriver på automatiskt blir gällande som lag i svensk domstol

april 23, 2009

Matters of fact and opinion

Sparat under: The Economist — Etiketter: — grundlag @ 1:03 e m

The purpose of this article is to rank the errors that we have found in the Economist intelligence unit´s rating of Swedish democracy, according to gravity and degree of certainty. Please note that all examples refer to the year 2006.
 

Blatant errors

Here are the most blatant and well-proven factual errors that we have found:

1. The European council, a government inquiry (2004) and Transparency international, are all aware of and critical to the lack of transparency of party-financing in Sweden. According to a recent (2009) report from the European council, Sweden is in violation of European anti-corruption regulations for this area.

2. Transparency international, a Swedish white collar union, the head of UN internal revisions, the opposition, and most scientific research, are all critical of the system of appointments in Sweden, and agree that it is, or most likely is, in violation of the UN convention against political corruption.

3. The Swedish government has suggested a law of electronic surveillance, which has been more far-reaching than any other in the Western world. This, in spite of the fact, that there is no new threat to Sweden.

4. A majority of Swedes belong to the state church, because the church and state in Sweden were finally separated as late as 2001.

5. The prestigious SOM institute for social research conducts regular surveys on a number of political and cultural issues in Sweden. According to their survey, trust in political parties in Sweden is around 16%.

6. The Nordic model, and especially the Swedish model, for the labor market gives extra-ordinary powers to the unions and employer organisations. In Sweden, there is also an issue with the way the central labor union helps finance the social-democratic party.

7. A bi-partisan government inquiry has concluded that a mayor problem in Swedish democracy since the second world war has been that the authorities have discouraged political participation.
 
Misrepresentations

The following are examples of areas for which it is well-established among political scientists and legal scholars in Sweden that Sweden is one of the least democratic of established democracies:

1. Both university text books about constitutional law, recent political events, and a recent comparative survey by the research unit of the Swedish parliament, show that Sweden has the least independent parliament among the OECD countries, and that the government de facto has supremacy over parliament.

2. University text books about constitutional law, legal scholars, a recent government inquiry, and the constitution itself, all show that the Swedish judiciary lacks independence.

3. The dominant-party system, in combination with a corrupt system of appointment to higher office, has excluded large groups of professionals from access to higher office in Sweden. The head of UN internal revisions, a recent evaluation by Swedish national broadcasting and the ombudsman against discrimination all illustrate this.

4. A main feature of the Swedish political system is a lack of checks and balances. It is well known in the political sciences that the U.K. and Sweden are the two extremes in the Western world, in this respect.

5. The discussion about the attitude of the social-democratic party towards property rights is well-documented and has been going on for many years.

 
Targeting the U.S.

The following errors are a result of poor question design, which seems to have been specifically aimed at the U.S., while at the same time obscuring problems with democracy in Sweden:

1. The EIU suggests half a point of for de facto two-party systems, but fail to include dominant-party systems as a similar criteria, even if the latter are more detrimental to political pluralism.

2. The EIU only has a choice of one point or no point on the question regarding use of torture. This obscures a middle ground, such as the discussion about hard interrogation techniques and the many complaints against Sweden to the UN committee against torture.

3. When the EIU asks about voter turnout, they only ask about the national level, but not the regional and federal levels. This obscures Sweden´s low voter turnout for EU elections, and hidden problems with voter turnout in local elections.
 
Inga-Britt Ahlenius

A special source, which we refer to with links to newspaper articles in Swedish, is Inga-Britt Ahlenius, the head of UN internal revisions. She is important because she validates criticisms of areas that may be difficult to prove systematically.

1. She has described Sweden as more or less infused by political corruption on all levels, to the point were conditions that would lead to prosecution in other countries have become normality in Sweden.

2. She has described Sweden as a ”soft state”, which is a state that is having problems delivering basic services. Her main explanation to this is the corrupt system of appointments to higher office.

3. She has criticised the general culture of lack of accountability in Sweden.

Circumstancial evidence

For the following areas there are a number of known circumstances, or research into parts of the problem, but it may be more difficult to find conclusive or more systematic evidence:

1. Discrimination of minorities.

2. Voice and participation of minorities

3. Lack of integrity of the civil service

4. Difficulties in redressing grievances, especially when the authorities are involved.

 

Everybody knows

The following areas are relatively well-known to those who are well-informed about Swedish history, political debate and scholarship. But they may be difficult to prove and also compare with other countries.

1. Political correctness

2. The lack of internal democracy in Swedish political parties

 

A mixed bag

The next two are a mixed bag. They have in common some special circumstance:

1. That members of the elite are exempted from prosecution is very difficult to prove systematically, even if well-informed swedes can recount a number of cases over the years where it seems likely that this has occurred

2. Different surveys give different ratings for trust of politicians, but the SOM survey clearly seems to be the most authoritative

 

Complex concepts

The last group reflects problems in defining concepts that the EIU have introduced when discussing political culture:

1. Differences in basic values between the political parties in Sweden, are well-documented regarding the constitution and human rights, but the whole concept of basic values needs to be discussed and defined in more detail

6. The lack of long-term stability in policies can be exemplified, but both these examples and the whole concept of long-term stability needs to be discussed and defined in more detail

april 21, 2009

Political culture

The fourth area in The Economist Intelligence unit´s democracy index is called “political culture”. It is one of two areas that the EIU claims are missing in other assessments of democracy. One of the lowest scores among the full democracies is for France, with 7.5 of 10.00.

This is the only area where Sweden does not have a full score. Sweden has lost a half point on the question of preferring the rule of experts or technocrats. However, as with area number three, this area also contains both factual errors and model problems.

1. The EIU asks if there is a sufficient degree of societal consensus and cohesion to underpin a stable, functioning democracy (Q IV:36). Compared to other established democracies, a marked feature of Swedish political culture is a rift in basic values between the leftist party and the social-democrats, on the one hand, and the opposition parties and the environmental party, on the other hand, regarding the content and status of the constitution, i. e. democracy itself. Education policy is another core area, which displays marked differences, in this case, between left and right. A result of these differences is an instability in policies, over time. Sweden also displays a lack of long-term stability in several other policy areas. One example is taxation. While most other Western countries slowly and steadily have increased taxation since the second world war, Sweden started of with relatively low levels, then rocketed to 67% in the 1980ies, and then dramatically reduced taxation during the 1990ies. Today (2009) the level is 47%, which is slightly lower than the highest tax country, Denmark. No other comparable democracy displays the same type of fluctuations, regarding taxation. Additional examples of this sort are trust in politicians, sick-leave, and state interference with the economy. However, the reasons for these instabilities may differ. A split in core values between left and right may be one reason. A lack of checks and balances and a weak tradition of political participation are two other possible explanations.

Our conclusion is that Sweden has a problem with stability in long-term policies, and that one reason for this is a rift in basic political values. However, it is difficult to know exactly what the EIU mean by a stable, functioning democracy.

2. The EIU asks if there is a strong tradition of the separation of church and state (Q IV:43). A majority of Swedes are members of the state church. At the same time, Sweden is one of the most secularised countries in the world. According to recent scholarship, secularism is most strongly related to the historical dominance of the state church. This fits Sweden perfectly. Sweden has had one of the most powerful state churches in the Western world. The reason that so many swedes are non-believers, and members of the state church at the same time, is that all swedes automatically became members of the state church at birth, until 2001. The state even still (by virtue of a special law) collects tax for the old state church. Full religious freedom in Sweden was introduced in 1951. Before that, you could only leave the state church if you changed to another recognised congregation or church. Local administration was led by the church until 1863, when separate church and secular administrations were introduced. Alternative religious meetings to those of the state church were strictly forbidden until 1858, under penalty of forced exile. Much of Swedish early history and historical identity is also firmly rooted in the struggle between protestantism and catholicism, in the 16 th and 17 th century.

These sociological and historical data serve to illustrate that Sweden has one of the weakest traditions of separation of church and state in Western europe. However, more important is probably the way that this heritage has influenced, and still influences, Swedish political culture.

- When the socialist hymn, the Internationale, was translated to Swedish, references to middle class values and natural rights were replaced by biblical motives

- Since the middle of the 19 th century, the role of Swedish academic philosophy has been to legitimise the current state ideology

- Extreme ideologies have taken turns to dominate Swedish 20 th century politics, such as rationalist social engineering in the 1940ies, marxism in the 1970ies, and radical feminism in the 1990ies

One example of the influence of radical feminism is the unique Swedish anti-prostitution law, which is based on a radical feminist interpretation of prostitution.

Yet, the EIU has given Sweden a full score on the question regarding a strong tradition of separation of church and state (Q IV:43).

Our conclusion is that Sweden should loose a half point on this question.

Regarding the ideology and historical background of the Swedish anti-prostitution law, you can try to contact Susanne Dodillet, PhD in history.

Regarding Swedish history and political culture in general, you can try to contact the journalist Maciej Zaremba. His work mail is: maciej.zaremba@dn.se

Svante Nordin, professor at the university of Lund, has written a classical history of Swedish philosophy. His work-mail is: svante.nordin@kultur.lu.se.

Model problems
Culture is the topic of social anthropology. We can define it as a set of more or less contested norms and values that help organise meaningful social interaction. These norms and values are expressed as institutions, symbols, rituals, etc. If we look at Sweden from this traditional anthropological point of view, an observation is that Swedish political culture can be described as an antithesis of U.S. political culture:

1. Core value: security (vs. freedom)
2. The state: the highest good (vs. a necessary evil)
3. View of society: what can my country do for me (vs. what can I do for my country)
4. Leading institution: the ministry of finance (vs. the supreme court)
5. Role of individual: anxious collectivism (vs. rugged individualism)
6. Core symbol: the national social insurance board (vs. the constitution)
7. Most prestigious office: general director (vs. supreme court judge)
8. Religion: viewed with derision (vs. presidents should believe in God)
9. Foundational text: a speech about social equality by the social-democratic party leader, in 1928 (vs. declaration of independence)
10. Foundational moment: ascent to power of the social-democratic party, in 1932 (vs. declaration of independence)
11. Yearly ritual: the finance minister carrying the budget from the government to the parliament (vs. the president´s speech to the nation)
12. Conflict resolution: corporativism and negotiations (vs. legalism and constitutionalism)
13. Civic virtue: paying your taxes (vs. community volunteering)
14. Hero myth: heroes are unswedish because they suggest that one individual can rise above the others (vs. talented and passionate individual reveals wrong-doings by government or large corporations, and has his or her day in court)
15. The nation: welfare nationalism (vs. proud patriotism)

The historical explanation to Swedish political culture, as captured above, is the relative minor impact of the Enlightenment, liberal democracy and the 19 th century middle classes. Sweden remained a largely medieval country, until the 1860ies. There was a compulsory state church until 1858. Local administration was led by the state church until 1862. Labor was organised by guilds until 1846/1864. The medieval diet, with four estates, remained in place until 1866. Full universal sufferage was introduced as late as 1920. Since then, Sweden has been dominated by one political party/movement.

Rapid economic and technical development since 1870 has obscured this fact, that Swedish political culture reflects a recent pre-modern pedigree. Sweden only really has two cultural traditions to fall back on: sub-polar, subsistence farming, in largely medieval peasant villages, and a strong Lutheran-orthodox, militarisitic and autocratic central government. (In the late 17th century, Swedes were the ”taliban of the north”). Most initiated commentators agree that 20th century Swedish society is the old Swedish peasant village writ large. However, they fail to add that it has been implemented with tools that have been handed down from the old religious autocracy. There is a saying that the swedes stepped out of the state church and into the social-democratic party. The result of this is a political culture that is characterised by a number of aspects that make it exceptional, compared with other Western democracies:

1. Extreme concentration of power, in all areas of society and walks of life
2. Almost no accountability for civil servants and the political- and economical elites
3. Corporativism, the kind and degree of which are foreign to the Western world
4. Political correctness, with a strongly moralistic, almost religious, overtone
5. Double standards, especially with regards to democracy and human rights
6. Political corruption throughout the civil service, the legal system and the state universities

If we sum up this area, Sweden should loose at least a full point, and maybe another half point. This equals a score of 8.1 (Norway, Czech republic). However, we have attempted to briefly describe and explain Swedish political culture. The result of this attempt is the conclusion that the EIU measure for political culture fails to capture differences between established democracies, with regards to core values of modernity and liberal democracy.

It is also worth noting that the EIU recognises that this area seems to favor smaller countries. The total sum of points is also low (8 and 7 as opposed to 12, 14 or 17), which gives this area up to twice the weight in the total score, compared to other areas.

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april 14, 2009

Political participation

The third area in The Economist Intelligence unit´s democracy index is called “political participation”. It is one of the two areas that the EIU claims are missing in other assessments of democracy. The U.K. has lost the most points: 4.5, which results in a score of 5.0 out of 10.00. This is a very low result for an established democracy.

The EIU has given Sweden a full score for this area. The following three examples suggest that something is wrong with the way that the EIU measures political participation:

- The largest inquiry in modern Swedish history, the bi-partisan 1997-2000 democracy inquiry, concluded that political developments in Sweden since world-war II had been a failure from the point of view of political participation, and that this was an important explanation to the political crisis in Sweden in the mid 1990ies.

- In area four (”political culture”) Sweden has lost a half point on the question about preferring the rule of experts or technocrats. This result suggests the opposite, that Sweden has a weak culture of political participation. The EIU does not seem to have noticed this contradiction.

- The journalist Maciej Zaremba´s articles about the Swedish international record in sick-leave and early retirement, suggest, as an important explanation to this record, a lack of political voice in local politics and in the labor market, with sick-leave as the only remaining ”exit”.

Why is it that Sweden, despite this, is the only country in the world that the EIU has given a full score for political participation? As with the other areas, one reason is that the EIU has failed to get all their facts straight. However, for this area there also seems to be model problems.

1. The EIU asks about voter turnout for national elections (Q III:27). This is another question that discriminates the U.S., with their high voter turnout in local elections but low turnout in national elections. Sweden has a relatively high voter turnout for national elections (82%, 2006), but a record low turnout for EU elections (among the old EU countries: 38%, 2004). It is worth noting that approximately 70% of new legislation in Sweden is decided by the EU. If the two local elections in Sweden were not coordinated with the national elections, one of these two (”landsting”) would probably also have only a 40% turnout. When voter turnout is below 50% the EIU gives no points. Since this indicator does not include the EU and local levels, these problems with voter turnout in Sweden are not captured.

Our conclusion is that Sweden has a serious voter turnout problem, both on the federal and local levels, and that the EIU index fails to reflect this.

2. The EIU asks if ethnic, religious and other minorities have a reasonable degree of autonomy and voice in the political process. If ”serious flaws” exist half a point is deducted (Q III:28). We have already mentioned the problems with discrimination in Sweden, and the plight of its indigenuous Sami population.

Our conclusion is that it is difficult to know what the EIU mean by ”serious flaws”, but that Sweden probably should loose a half point for this question.

3. The EIU asks about membership in political parties and political NGO:s. If neither is above 7% half a point is deducted (Q III:30). We have already shown that membership in political parties in Sweden has been declining since the 1980ies, and is now at a record low 7%. The EIU category ”political NGO” does not seem to have a clear definition. Sweden is one of the few, if not the only corporativist society in the Western world. This results in high membership in organisations, for example unions. But to what extent is that a positive thing in terms of political participation in a liberal democracy? The long standing critique of corporativism in Sweden is that it reduces political participation. And if Swedes are members of Amnesty or Greenpeace, and these organisations are focused on global issues, what is the relevance for Swedish democracy?

Our conclusion is that Sweden has a problem with membership in political parties, and that the EIU index fails to reflect this.

4. The EIU asks if authorities make a serious effort to promote political participation. If only some attempts are made, half a point is deducted (Q III:28). We have already mentioned the bi-partisan 1997-2000 democracy inquiry. This inquiry concluded that the authorities in Sweden have done the very opposite, since the second world war. They have actively discouraged all forms of political participation, except attending the ballots each three or four years, and membership in established corporativist organisations.

Yet, the EIU have given Sweden a full score on the question regarding the authorities efforts to promote political participation (Q III:28).

Our conclusion is that Sweden should loose a full point on this question.

Model problems
The model problems as above only partly explain why this area fails to reflect the lack of real political participation in Sweden. The more general reason seems to be that the EIU indicators measure form instead of content, quantity instead of quality, and activities rather than outcomes. For example:

- What is the point of being member of a union, if the union is not democratic internally, or has other priorities than the welfare of its members?

- How much is an expressed readiness to take part in lawful demonstrations worth, when Swedes in reality protest by resorting to anonymous threats or sick-leave?

If we sum up this area, Sweden should loose a full point, and with correction for question design perhaps another 2 or 2.5 points. A loss of 3.5 points is equivalent to a score of 6.11 (Spain). However, this is only if political participation is defined according to the EIU model. In reality, lack of political participation is a much more serious problem in Sweden than the EIU survey is able to reflect.

It is worth noting that the EIU recognises that this area seems to favor smaller countries. The total sum of points is also low: 8 as opposed to 12, 14 or 17. This gives this area up to twice the weight in the total score, compared to other areas.

Another reflection is that this area may have been created because of the availability of indicators from the World Value Survey, rather than the EIU having put real thought behind the model and choice of indicators.

A third reflection is that the EIU view of political participation seems to reflect 19th and early 20th century standards, a period when liberal democracy still was contested and there were serious conflicts between ideologies, nations and classes. Today, we live in a more peacefull and content world. Lack of political participation, in the 19th century sense, may therefore be a sign of good health, rather than a problem. In any case, less participation has been a general trend, for some time, and in most Western countries.

mars 12, 2009

Civil liberties

The fifth, and final, area in The Economist Intelligence unit´s democracy index is called ”civil liberties”. Areas four and five are of a more nebulous character, and we will therefore review them last. Civil liberties, on the other hand, is a core area when evaluating democracy. The lowest score among the EIU group of full democracies is for the U.S., with 8.53 of 10.00. This is equivalent to a loss of two and a half points.

The EIU has given Sweden a full score. We have already shown that this is incorrect, for the question regarding new risks and threats as an excuse for curbing liberties (Q V:60). Sweden should most likely loose half a point on that question. There are also a number of other questions for which Sweden most likely should have a deduction.

It should be noted that it is difficult to find systematic evidence, with regard to several of the questions for this area, especially if you want to pinpoint a specific year. We therefore have to rely more heavily on a general historical and political perspective, and on journalists and scholars, whom you can contact for further discussion.

At the same time, this methodological and empirical problem begs a question: what empirical support does the EIU have for their assessment of civil rights in Sweden?

1. The EIU asks if media coverage is ”robust” and if there is a ”reasonable diversity of opinions” (Q V:47). The strongest and most recurrent criticism of Swedish democracy, during the last 40 years, is that of conformity in public debate. This criticism has included references to concepts such as ”soft totalitarianism”, ”the conformity of silence” and ”inner censorship”. In the social sciences, these recurrent criticisms have been called ”the hypothesis of the indoctrinated Swedes”. Maciej Zaremba is one of Sweden´s leading journalists. In a book from 1999, he takes the view that Sweden is/has been an ethnic or ”volk” democracy, and that if you criticise a political myth in such a democracy, the response will be ethnic slurs rather than educated debate, from those who defend the myth. Jonathan Friedman is a former professor of anthropology, at the University of Lund, and current professor at the prestigious École des Haute Études, in Paris. He has been a sharp critic of political correctness in Sweden during the last ten years. The most recent (2007) example is perhaps a critical review of cultural sections in Swedish newspapers, by a Danish journalist. His conclusion was that in Swedish newspapers there was a ”culture of consensus”, compared with Denmark. (For possible historical explanations to this, see the article about the area political culture!)

Our conclusion is that Sweden should loose at least a half point on this question.

You can try to reach Maciej Zaremba at his work mail: maciej.zaremba@dn.se

You can try to reach professor Jonathan Friedman at the corporate mail of the École des Haute Études: iris@ehess.fr

The newspaper that ordered the critical review by the Danish journalist was Göteborgsposten. You can try to reach their cultural editor at their corporate mail: kultur@gp.se

2. The EIU asks if ”institutions provide citizens with the opportunity to successfully petition government to redress grievances” (Q V:50). Supposedly, the EIU means both conflicts between citizens and between the individual and the state. The Swedish legal system has had problems with resources for some time. A consequence of this is that many minor offenses between citizens are not processed. The laws that address wrong-doings by civil servants in Sweden are weak, to the point of being inconsequential, and courts and prosecutors are unwilling to deal seriously with cases that may embarass the civil service, or the upper-echelons of society. This is a natural consequence of the political corruption and lack of checks and balances in Sweden, as described in previous articles. Sweden is also one of the countries with the lowest level of compensation in tort cases and the weakest protection of patient´s rights. Beginning in 2005, Swedish courts have taken an increased interest in tort cases, based on the Swedish incorporation of the European convention, but this is a recent development, and the Swedish tradition is rather the opposite. The European convention is Swedish law, since 1995, but not lex superior, and may therefore have to yield if it conflicts with other laws.

Our conclusion is that Sweden should loose a half point on this question.

3. The EIU asks if the state uses torture (Q V:51). This is another question that seems to be specifically designed to target the U.S., since it does not allow for a middle alternative, only yes or no. This obscures the discussion regarding so called hard interrogation techniques. The Swedish state does not use torture, in the way that we usually understand this term. However, the UN committee against torture has repeatedly criticised Sweden, as shown by these statistics on their home page. Sweden, according to these statistics, is worse than other countries in two respects. In the number of complaints, and in the ratio of complaints deemed valid by the committee. This suggests that something that falls in the realm of torture is not all well in Sweden.

Our conclusion is that Sweden has a problem regarding torture, as defined by the UN committee against torture, but that this is not covered by the EIU model.

4. The EIU asks if the ”judiciary is independent of government influence” (Q V:52). We have already mentioned the politicised appointment of higher judges. This appointment process may be in violation of article six (fair trial) in the European convention on human rights. This, because Swedish judges often first have worked in ministries, where they have authored the laws that they later apply as judges. There is also systematic evidence that the higher courts overturn rulings by lower courts, in favor of the government. It can be noted, that Swedish translations of American movies refer to the media as the ”third branch of government”, because the legislature in Sweden is not considered an independent branch of government. There are also a number of indirect ways, in which the judiciary is undermined in Sweden. Since they are many, and unusual, we have made a list:

- The priciple of rule of law is officially rejected by the social-democratic party. Instead, they advocate rule by law
- The principle of natural law is officially rejected by the social-democratic party. Instead, they advocate legal positivism
- The principle of inalienable human rights protected by independent courts has officially been rejected by the social-democratic party, on the grounds that such rights would stand in the way of ”urgent social reforms”
- The principle of constitutionalism is denied by the social-democratic party. Sweden therefore lacks a real constitution. Instead, Sweden has a constitutional charter of sorts, which is descriptive, not normative
- International conventions are not valid in Swedish courts until they have been transformed to Swedish law. Sweden thus regularly signs international conventions without any intentions to apply them in Sweden
- Laws in Sweden lack independence. Neither the principle of common law, nor that of legal autonomy apply, but rather interpretation based on the original will of the government, a so called ”teleological method”
- Laws in Sweden are made porrous by being too generally written, while at the same time containing generally phrased loop-holes. This reduces accountability, from a government point of view, and increases arbitrariness, from a citizen point of view
- Legal scholars are disencouraged to partake in political debate, and the position of legal doctrine is generally weak

Our conclusion is that Sweden has one of the least independent judiciaries in the Western world, and possibly even less independent than in many less developed countries. Sweden should therefore loose at least a half point on this question.

You can try to contact Joakim Nergelius, professor of jurisprudence at the Örebro university, and author of one of two university text books about Swedish constitutional law.

You can try to contact Henrik von Sydow, centre-conservative member of parliament, regarding the appointment of judges. His work-mail is: henrik.von.sydow@riksdagen.se.

You can try Karl-Göran Algotsson, who has written a classical monograph (1985) about the social-democratic party´s attitude towards civil rights.

You can also try Wiveka Warnling-Nerep, professor of law at the Stockholm university, and co-author of one of two university text books about Swedish constitutional law. Her work-mail is: wiweka.warnlingnerep@juridicum.su.se.

5. The EIU asks ”whether favoured members of groups are spared prosecution under the law” (Q V:54). A general result of political corruption in Sweden is that members of the political and economical elites rarely are prosecuted, and if they are prosecuted – if it can not be avoided because of too high-profile cases -, they are rarely sanctioned in the final appeal to the upper courts.

Our conclusion is that Sweden should loose at least a half point on this question.

You can try Dennis Töllborg, professor of law at the Gothenburg university. He has criticised Swedish prosecutors for being afraid of seriously prosecuting civil servants, because it may risk their career advancement. His work-mail is: Dennis.Toellborg@gri.gu.se.

6. The EIU asks about ”the extent to which private property rights [are] protected” (Q V:56). It is well known that property rights is one of the rights that is most poorly protected in Sweden. The other two are the right to family and personal integrity. The first ever ruling for a violation of property rights, according to the European convention, was a Swedish case (Sporrong-Lönnroth vs. Sweden).

Our conclusion is that Sweden should loose a half point on this question.

You can try Karl-Göran Algotsson, a political scientist who has written a classical monograph about property rights in Sweden.

7. The EIU asks about ”popular perceptions on human rights protection”, and refer to the World Value Survey (Q V:58). What people think, and what is true, may not be the same. One way of reviewing this question would be to name three examples of serious and repeated international criticism for infringement of human rights in Sweden, during the last five to ten years. Most Swedes will not read this blogg, so you can try to interview Swedes, and ask them if they know about one or more of the following violations or infringements:

- Sweden holds a negative record with the UN committee against torture, as above.
- International organisations have strongly criticised the way that prisoners are treated in Sweden. You can try to contact Birgitta Winberg, the Swedish head of the IPCA.
- The Swedish government has repeatedly lost cases in the European court for human rights, because of belated handling of court cases. In all, some 120 000 cases in the last ten years may have had their right to a fair trail infringed.

Did you know about this? Can you find ten random Swedes that know about this?

Update (August 2009): The European council committe against torture has just released a new report condemning conditions in Swedish prisons. The criticisms are the same as in the 2003 report (abuse of restriction and isolation). This shows that Sweden has not listened to this criticism, six years running. Of course, helped on by claims by The Economist, and others, that Sweden has a perfect human rights record.

Our conclusion is that Swedes in general are not well-informed about human rights abuses in their own country. How legitimate fear, or a lack of fear of human rights abuses, in Sweden may be, is difficult to have an opinion on. It depends on what you choose to compare with.

8. The EIU asks if there is ”significant discrimination on the basis of people’s race, colour or creed” (Q V:59). Sweden holds several negative European records regarding discrimination of immigrants, such as living segregation and a low rate of inter-ethnic marriages. A case in point is the 2007 debate in British press regarding Somalies, who after several years in Sweden gave up trying to establish themselves, and instead moved to England, where their relatives are far better of. The reasons for this are Swedish attitudes to foreigners, especially expressed through so called institutional racism. Sweden also has a both historical and present problem, in the way that it has treated its indigenous Sami population. For example, Sweden is the only Nordic country that has not signed the international treaty for protection of indigenous populations (ILO).

Our conclusion is that Sweden should loose a half point on this question.

Regarding the plight of the Swedish indigenous population, you can try the Sami politician Olof T Johansson or the Sami diet.

You can also try to contacy the journal Invandrare och Minorieter, which is dedicated to questions regarding immigration and minorities in Sweden.

If we sum up this area, Sweden could potentially loose somewhere between four and half and six and a half points, which is twice or even three times as much as for the U.S. This would propel Sweden way down into the group of flawed democracies. At the same time, this is the area that is most difficult to review, both in terms of how many points Sweden should loose, and because of a lack of systematic evidence.

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januari 22, 2009

Functioning of government

The second area in The Economist Intelligence Unit´s Democracy index is called ”functioning of government”. This area seems to be more problematic for established democracies. France has lost the most among the ”full democracies”, with three and a half points down (score 7.5 out of 10.0).

The EIU has given Sweden a full score for this area. We have already shown that Sweden should have at least a half point of on the question regarding corruption (Q II:22). For the two last questions, regarding trust in politicians and political parties, Sweden should most likely also loose a half and a full point, respectively. At least four more questions are also candidates for a deduction.

1. The EIU asks if the legislature is the ”supreme political body with a clear supremacy over other branches of government” (Q II:14). Political scientists sometimes claim that Sweden has a ”monistic” system. This means that all power is in the hands of a majority in parliament, much like the British system. However, in reality this is not true. Instead, the Swedish parliament is often referred to as a ”transport company”, meaning that it only confirms policy that has been decided elsewhere. In 2008, a group of young members of parliament wanted to oppose the new electronic surveillance law. They were so severly pressured by their party leadership that all but one caved in, and one of them even cried in parliament. If a member of parliament digresses from the party-line in Sweden, he or she can expect to be canceled from the nominations in the coming elections. Anne-Marie Pålsson, a member of parliament, has recently (2008) let the Swedish parliament´s research unit compare the independence of parliament in OECD countries. They found that the Swedish parliament was the least independent.

Update (May 2009): Anne-Marie Pålsson has announced (in the news, 21/5) that she resigns as MP, the reason being that real power in Sweden lies with the government and the political parties, instead of with the parliament.

Yet, the EIU has given Sweden full points on the question regarding the supremacy of parliament over other branches of government (Q II:14).

Our conclusion is that Sweden should loose a half point, if not more, on this question.

You can try to contact Fredrik Federley, the member of parliament that cried before caving in.

Anne-Marie Pålsson can be contacted at her work mail:
anne-marie.palsson@riksdagen.se.

For an academic point of view on the relation between parliament and government, you can try to contact Joakim Nergelius, professor of jurisprudence at the Örebro university.

2. The EIU asks about ”checks and balances on the exercise of government authority” (Q II:15). It is difficult to know exactly what the EIU are asking for here. Does ”government” include only the executive, or all branches of government? There is also a need to distinguish between ”separation of powers” and ”checks and balances”. To answer the more general question, it is well known among political scientists that the U.K. and Sweden are the two extremes in the Western world regarding a lack of checks and balances. In several respects, Sweden is also worse than the U.K.. If we look specifically at the executive, British courts can nullify government acts that violate laws. This can only be done by Swedish courts if the transgression is ”obvious”. No other Western judiciary has a similar restraint. Another example is the head of state. Among parliamentary systems with an hereditary head of state, the Swedish king is the least empowered of all. Important is also the corrupt system for appointments to higher office in Sweden, including judges. The British have an exemplary such appointment system. We can not cover the subjects of separation of powers and checks and balances in their entirety here, but we have constructed a chart with an overview comparison between Sweden and the U.K. What this chart illustrates is that there is less separation of powers in Sweden than in the U.K.:

  U.K. Sweden
Legislature Vote for a person Vote for a party
  Parliamant central to political life Parliament described as a ”transport company”
  Two chambers One chamber
Executive Exemplary system for appointments to higher office Pre-modern and most likely corrupt system for appointments to higher office
  The head of state retains some formal power The head of state lacks all formal power
  Ministers have full responsibility Nominally independet government agencies
Judiciary Independent appointment of judges Politicised appointment of higher judges
  Legal review of government acts Curtailed legal review of government acts
  No legal review of parliamentary laws Curtailed legal review of parliamentary laws

 

Yet, the EIU have given Sweden a full score for the question regarding checks and balances on the excersice of government authority (Q II:15).

Our conclusion is that Sweden should loose at least a half point on this question.

A liberal-conservative think tank conducted a research project in the 1990:ies, aimed at constitutional reform. The critical title of their final report was: ”Power without checks and balances”. You can try to contact Nils Karlsson, the head of this research project, at the think tank Ratio.

You can also try Iain Cameron, professor of law at the Uppsala university. He is of Scotish origin and has commented on the Swedish lack of legal review for government acts. Work mail: Iain.Cameron@jur.uu.se. Work phone: 46(0)18 471 20 23.

This topic will be covered again in the article for the fifth area, when we discuss the independence of the judiciary.

3. The EIU asks about the influence of ”powerful domestic groups” parallel to democratic institutions (Q II:18). The core of the ”Nordic model” for the labor market is that collective bargaining between unions and employer organisations replaces legislation. In Sweden, such collective agreements are said to have ”normative power”, i.e. they infringe on what is usually a power that only the legislature has. In Sweden, it is also arguably the case that much of the real power does not lie with the political parties, but with the central labor union and the central employer organisation. For example, in the 2002 election campaign, economic support from the central labor union to the social-democratic party exceeded that to the 2004 Bush-campaign, six-fold, per capita.

Yet, the EIU has given Sweden full points for the question regarding the undue influence of powerful domestic groups parallel to parliament (Q II:18).

Our conclusion is that Sweden should loose a full point on this question.

You can try to contact Maria Rankka at the liberal think tank Timbro, regarding the influence of the central labor union in Swedish politics. Corporate e-mail: info@timbro.se.

You can also try to contact two leading political journalist, PJ Anders Linder and Per T Ohlsson. Work mail: per.t.ohlsson@sydsvenskan.se and pj.anders.linder@svd.se.

Regarding the central labor union and its financial support to the social-democratic party (2003-2006) you can try the social-liberal MP Carl Hamilton. Work mail: carl.b.hamilton@riksdagen.se

4. The EIU asks if there are ”sufficient mechanisms and institutions in place for ensuring government accountability in between elections” (Q II:19). It is not clear exactly what they include in this. Sweden has a parliamentary system, which means that parliament can always hold a vote of no confidence. Once, in 1988, the implicit threat of such a vote led to the resignation of a minister. However, those were very serious circumstances in relation to the investigation into the assassination of prime minister Olof Palme (1986). In all other respects, a characteristic of Swedish democracy is a general lack of accountability. We have already mentioned that government acts only can be nullified by the courts in extreme cases. Another example is that Sweden and Finland are the only two countries in the Western world with small ministries and large independent agencies. A consequence of this system is that there is no real ministerial accountability. The auditing institutions in Sweden are also weak, and Swedish civil servants can not be questioned by parliamentary committees under oath. When the inquiry into the Swedish government´s handling of the Tsunami-catastrophy attempted to allocate individual responsability (2005) , this was seen as something completely new and revolutionary in Swedish political life. This inquiry also criticised the fact that they could not question civil servants under oath.

Yet, the EIU has given Sweden no deduction on the question regarding government accountability between elections (Q II:19).

Our conclusion is that Sweden should loose at least a half point on this question.

For this subject you should try to contact Inga-Britt Ahlenius, the head of UN internal revisions. She used to be the head of the Swedish national audit office.

You can also try professor Olof Petersson, one of Sweden´s leading professors of political science.

5. The EIU asks about transparency and public access to information (Q II:21). Sweden has one of the oldest and most far-reaching freedom of information acts. Sweden even claims that this is a democratic tradition that they would like to bring to the European union, in order to improve European democracy. However, some Swedish scholars and journalists would not agree that openness in Sweden is well-functioning. They claim that authorities frequently abuse their right under the secrecy law to withhold documents that they do not want to make public. The freedom of information act in Sweden may look good on paper, but, according to these critics, reality is quite different. There is also a more general problem of transparency in Sweden, because of its corporativist political culture, which focuses on negotiations between representatives. A result of this is a general lack of transparency in all decision-making in Swedish society, and is one explanation to why the Swedish parliament is a moot point. This aspect of Swedish democracy has been especially pointed out by Leif Lewin, professor of political science at the Uppsala university.

Our conclusion is that there is not sufficient evidence and studies about actual transparency in Sweden, compared with that in other countries, but the general lack of transparency that results from the corporativist political culture most likely should merit the loss of half a point.

Update (November 2009): There is increasing ciriticism among journalists and scholars in Sweden of the way that the Swedish government handles openness. One strategy used by the government is to simply issue new laws to cover individual cases, when it wants to cover something up. One of the new critics is Thomas Bull, professor of constitutional law at the Uppsala university. According to Bull, the main rule in Sweden today is secrecy, not openness. He also concludes that, in practice, Sweden today does not differ from other European countries, in this respect. To this should be added that several recent cases suggest a higher degree of secrecy in Sweden in high profile political cases (documents that name former soviet collaborators, the Swedish government´s handling of the Tsunami catastrophy, etc).

Our conclusion remains the same. Swedish government in generall is more closed, because of the countries corporativist political culture. Regarding formal access to documents, there is still a lack of comparative information, even if currrent knowlegde suggests that Sweden is less open than other countries, when it really matters to the political elites.

You can try to contact professor Thomas Bull, at the Uppsala university. His work-mail is Thomas.Bull@jur.uu.se.

Another of the new critics is the journalist Nils Funcke, recently editor-in-cheif of the parliament´s journal (Riksdag & Departement) and currently the head of a government enquiry regarding freedom of speech in Sweden.

You can try to contact the journalist Anders R Olsson. He has recently written a book about this topic. His contact e-mail is: info@anders-r-olsson.se.

For an academic point of view, the liberal think tank Timbro has published an anthology, which contains an article regarding abuse of the secrecy law.

6. The EIU asks if the civil service is ”willing and capable to implement government policy” (Q II: 23). This question is more problematic than it may seem. It does not take in account that the civil service can be too willing. A civil service can be more sensitive to the will of the government than to the actual content of laws and government acts. Such a lack of integrity will undermine the rule of law. A case in point is the Swedish international record for early retirement and prolonged sick-leave. This failure in Swedish politics was made possible because the civil service was more attentive to the will of the government than to the common good and existing laws and regulations. When the political will now has turned against the sick, the civil service is again flouting laws and regulations, but this time to minimise early retirement and sick-leave.

This is an example of poor question design. A problem that is two-dimensional has been reduced to only one dimension.

For a critical analysis of the Swedish world record in early retirement and sick-leave, you can try the journalist Maciej Zaremba at the largest Swedish daily. He has written a series of articles on this subject in 2004. His work-mail is: maciej.zaremba@dn.se.

For a similar academic point of view, you can try Lotta Vahlne Westerhäll, guest professor of social law at the Karlstad University. Work-mail: Lotta.Westerhall@law.gu.se.

7. The EIU asks about public confidence in government (Q II:25). The most authoritative survey regarding such confidence in Sweden is the one carried out by the SOM-institute at the Gothenburg university. According to their survey, confidence in government was 32% in 2007. According to the EIU, 25-40% should lead to a half point deduction. We can also look at how many thought that the government was doing a good job. Only 30% tought they were doing a good job, in 2006. Confidence in the parliament was 33% in 2006. It can be worth noting that the EIU instructions state that the World Value Survey should be used only if there are no other sources.

Yet, the EIU have given Sweden no deduction on the question regarding public confidence in government (Q II:25).

Our conclusion is that Sweden should loose a half point on this question.

The reports from the SOM-institute are easily available on their home page. They even have versions in english! If this is not enough you can try to contact the head of this institute, professor Sören Holmberg at the Gothenburg university.

9. The EIU also asks about public confidence in political parties (Q II:26). According to the SOM survey for 2007, this confidence was as low as 16%. According to the EIU, 24% and below should lead to a full point deduction. One can also mention the confidence rating for politicians in general. In 2006, it was 37%. As a matter of fact, confidence in politicians has been an important problem in Swedish society for the last ten to fifteen years, even if some of the ratings have picked up slightly the last few years. At its worst, in and around 1998, Sweden and Italy were two of the countries in Europe with the lowest confidence in politicians.

Yet, the EIU have given Sweden no deduction on the question regarding public confidence in political parties (Q II:25).

Our conclusion is that Sweden should loose a full point on this question.

If we sum up this area, Sweden should loose at least 4.0 points, and maybe another full point, if model problems are taken in account. Instead of a score of 10.0, this would result in a score between 7.1 (Bulgaria) and 6.4 (Colombia). This would propel Sweden far down the ranks in the group of flawed democracies, for this area.

A number of special comments are in place here:

- This is an area that strongly suggests that the EIU has not had access to any real knowledge about Swedish society. Lack of accountability, lack of checks and balances, and the lack of independence of parliament, are all three fundamental and well-known aspects of Swedish democracy.

- Several of the questions for this area are difficult to gauge. For example, should Sweden loose a half point or a full point on the question regarding the independence of parliament? The EIU does not provide enough information in order to determine this.

- Government in Sweden has serious problems that are not reflected by the indicators for this area. In several areas, it fails to deliver due to a lack of resources. This has been so since the financial crisis in the mid 1990ies. Sweden has even been described as a ”soft state”, by Inga_britt Ahlenius, the Swedish head of UN internal revision (2005).

- The EIU indicators for this area do not cover problems with inefficiency in the public sector in Sweden. In a 2003 survey by the European central bank, Swedish public sector ranked the lowest in efficiency among 23 studied countries.

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januari 6, 2009

A ”near perfect” democracy?

Sparat under: The Economist — Etiketter:, , — grundlag @ 12:28 e m

In this article we summarise areas for which Sweden comes across as one of the least-, if not the least democratic country among established democracies. This, as a balance to The Economist Intelligence unit´s conclusion that Sweden is a ”near perfect” democracy:

1. Transparency of party-financing
2. Political corruption
3. Electronic surveillance
4. System for appointments to higher office
5. Dominant-party system
6. Independence of parliament
7. Checks and balances
8. Corporativism
9. Government accountability
10. Integrity of the civil service
11. Independence of the judiciary
12. Rule of law
13. Influence of powerful domestic groups
14. Property rights, family rights and personal integrity
15. Political correctnes
16. Voter turnout in federal (=EU) elections
17. Efforts from the authorities to promote political participation
18. ”Soft state”
19. Tradition of separation of church and state
20. Agreement on basic values (constitution, human rights, education)
21. Patient´s rights
22. Compensation in tort cases
23. Efficiency of public sector
24. …

Please note that this list refers to 2006, the year of the first survey by The Economist. Changes may have ocurred since then.

Electoral process and pluralism

The first area in The Economist Intelligence Unit´s democracy index is called ”electoral process and pluralism”. This area contains basic questions about free and fair elections, hence none of the ”full democracies” has lost more than one point (score 9.17 of 10.00).

The EIU gives Sweden full points for this area, but we have already shown that Sweden should have no point on the question about party-financing (Q I:7). This would move Sweden from a leading (10.0) to a laggard (9.17) position within the group of ”full democracies”. However, three more questions also raise important issues about pluralism in Sweden:

1. The EIU asks wether opposition parties have ”a realistic prospect of achieving government”, and if a country has a de facto two-party system they loose half a point (Q I:10). Sweden belongs to a small group of established democracies (Canada, Japan, Ireland, …) that have been dominated for long periods of time by one political party. In this group, Sweden is exceptional in several ways. The social-democrats ruled Sweden uninterrupted for 44 years, between 1932 and 1976. Between 1982 and 2006 they ruled 21 out of 24 years. The opposition has only once been able to stay two terms in power, and that was 30 years ago. (Opposition in government since 1932: 1936/100 days; WWII national unity government; 1976-1979; 1979-1982 and 1991-1994). When discussing pluralism, it should be noted that the Swedish state during this period has had far-reaching ambitions to monopolise many areas of society and walks of life. One result of this has been that distinctions between society, state and the social-democratic party have become blurred. When the opposition lost the election 2002, the leader of the social-liberal party, Lars Leijonborg, complained that the social-democrats had ”successfully indoctrinated the people”. The opposition then decided to recast itself in the image of the dominant party, in order to win the election 2006. It is therefore no coincidence that Sweden to and fro has been described as a de facto one-party system. The EIU seems to think that a de facto two-party system – such as that in the U.S. – is less pluralistic than the Swedish dominant-, or de facto one-party system.

Our conclusion is that lack of pluralism is a much more serious problem in Sweden than in the U.S.. Sweden should therefore loose at least a half point on this question.

For more information about the Swedish de facto one-party system you can try to contact Maria Rankka at the liberal think tank Timbro. Corporate e-mail: info@timbro.se.

You can also try Hans Bergström, former editor-in-chief of Sweden´s largest daily. After retiring, in 2003, he criticised the Swedish de facto one-party system in an interview in a Samizdat magazine. He now lives in the U.S. His contact mail is: bergstrom_hans@hotmail.com.

2. The EIU asks if voters are offered a ”range of choices”, and if there are ”essentially unrestricted conditions for the presentation of candidates” (Q I:1). It is unclear if they mean just political parties, or both parties and individual candidates. Sweden has a strictly proportional electoral system. This results in a greater than average number of political parties, three to the left and four to the right. This means that there is a wide range of parties to choose from. However, the party lists of candidates for parliament are very much controlled by top party-leadership. Young politicians claim that the best way to become a member of parliament is to make coffee for this leadership. The political parties are also generally socially closed and excluding. In a broader perspective, the political parties as a base for democracy in Sweden is also problematic. They used to have a high legitimacy, but since the 1980:ies they have had a dramatic drop in membership. Their confidence rating is also very low. In the 2007 SOM survey, conducted by the Gothenburg university, only 16% of the population had a lot or some confidence in the political parties. It would be incorrect to claim that Swedes freely choose their most important representatives, the members of parliament. In so far as this is legitimate in a party-based democracy, it is still problematic that Swedish political parties suffer from a democratic deficit.

Our conclusion is that Sweden should loose a half point on this question.

For more information about the culture of Swedish political parties you can try to contact Bo Rothstein, professor of political science at the University of Gothenburg. Work mail: bo.rothstein@pol.gu.se.

Another expert in this area that you can try to contact is Tommy Möller, professor of political science at the Stockholm university. E-mail: tommy.moller@statsvet.su.se. Work phone: 46(0)8-162530.

3. The EIU asks if ”potential access to public office” is ”open to all citizens”. Already in the 1940:ies, civil servants started to display their social-democractic party-membership, in order to further their careers. In the 50:ies and 60:ies this had become commonplace. We have already mentioned the corrupt system of appointment for higher office. The combined result of the one-party dominance and this corrupt system is that political contacts have become more important than professional merits, in order to reach higher office. The new government, which was installed in september 2006, has improved openness when recruiting to higher office, starting in March 2007. A result of this has been a greater percentage of women and people with an ethnic background. This constitutes and indirect proof of sorts that the system before and during 2006 discriminated these categories. Arguably, at least until March 2007, access to higher office in Sweden favored ethnic Swedish men with a membership in the social-democratic party.

Our conclusion is that Sweden should loose a half point on this question.

Regarding the role of social-democratic party-membership for recruitment of civil servants in Sweden you can try Leif Lewin, professor of political science at the Uppsala university. Work-mail: leif.lewin@statsvet.uu.se

National Swedish radio news has recently (2/1-2009) studied the effects of the more open appointment process. You can try to contact them via their news desk mail: ekot@sr.se. This is a link to their home page.

The discrimination ombudsman has also recently commented on this. You can try to contact her at the corporate mail: do@do.se.

If we sum up this area, Sweden should probably loose 2.5 points. Instead of a score of 10.0, this would result in a score of 7.91. This is the same score as for South Africa, and places Sweden in the group of ”flawed democracies”, for this area.

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december 14, 2008

The Economist Intelligence Unit´s index of democracy

The British magazine The Economist has published an index of democracy for 2006 and 2008. According to this index, Sweden is a ”near perfect democracy”. A close examination of the questions of their survey suggests that something may be seriously wrong with the EIU:s sources. In this article we will begin a critical review of the EIU:s rating of Swedish democracy.

In the five main articles of our review, we will examine the EIU survey question by question, we will discuss model problems, and we will provide insights into Swedish political culture and history. We will also provide our readers with contact information to Swedish sources.

Here are three (of many) examples that have fueled our suspicions:

1. Sweden, Malta, San Marino and Switzerland where in 2004 the only countries in Europe without a regulated transparency for party-financing, according to a survey conducted by the European council. It should then be noted that Sweden is a party-based democracy, while Switzerland has a strong system of direct democracy. The other two countries are the smallest in Europe. Only lately, in the autumn of 2008, has the dominant social-democratic party expressed an intent to declare all contributions greater than 20 000 EUR. The second largest party, the centre-conservatives, flatly reject regulated transparency of party-financing. In 2006 and 2008 there was thus no real transparency of party-financing in Sweden.

Update (April 2009): The European council has published a new report regarding party-financing in Sweden, dated the 19 th of February 2009. We quote from the conclusions in this report:

”The current system of political financing in Sweden, falls short of the standards provided for in the Recommendation Rec(2003)4 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on common rules against corruption in the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns …”

Yet, the EIU has given Sweden a full score for transparency of party-financing (Q I:7).

Our conclusion is that Sweden should loose a full point on this question.

For more information you can try to contact the leading Swedish expert in this area, professor Gullan Gidlund at the Örebro universitygullan.gidlund@oru.se. Mobile: 46(0)76-134 42 12.

2. In 2006, an inquiry by a Swedish white-collar union (SACO) concluded that appointments to higher office in Sweden violate the UN convention against political corruption. Transparency international expressed similar concerns at a seminar in 2006. Inga-Britt Ahlenius, the Swedish head of the UN internal revision, has also described Swedish appointments to higher office as politically corrupt, and Swedish society as more or less infused by political corruption. It may be of importance to know that Sweden is most likely the country in the Western world with the least balanced and transparent appointment process for higher office, including high judges. This process started to improve somewhat beginning in March 2007, but this has yet to affect the overall problem of political corruption.

Yet, the EIU have given Sweden no deduction on the question regarding corruption (Q II:22).

Our conclusion is that Sweden should loose at least a half point for this question.

An expert in this area that you can try to contact is Tommy Möller, professor of political science at the Stockholm university. E-mail: tommy.moller@statsvet.su.se. Work phone: 46(0)8-162530.

3. The EIU asks the question to what extent ”government invokes new risks and threats as an excuse for curbing civil liberties”. This question seems aimed at the U.S. and U.K.. However, it is problematic because it is fully legitimate for democracies to curb liberties, when required to protect its citizens. The question is how and how far. The key word here seems to be ”excuse”. In 2006, the new Swedish government re-issued a law that was initiated by the former government. This law suggests far-reaching infringments in personal integrity through electronic surveillance. The IT-company Google has described it as ”Chinese”, i.e. as foreign to the Western world. It should then be noted that there are real terrorist threats to the U.S. and U.K, but no such threats exist for Sweden. The Swedish law has recently (2008) been denounced to the European commission by a Swedish human rights centre (Centrum för rättvisa). An important reason was that it was more far-reaching than a similar British law, that recently has been rejected by the European commission.

Update (April 2009): after strong protests initiated in the blogosphere, the law has been amended, and may now possibly comply with European standards. This does not, however, change the 2006 assessment. And Centrum för rättvisa has not withdrawn its complaint. Furthermore, Norway also has a complaint at the European court, because Norwegian citizens will be affected by Swedish surveillance.

Yet, the EIU has given Sweden no deduction for this question (Q V:60).

Our conclusion is that Sweden should loose a half point for this question.

You can try to contact the responsible lawyer at the above-mentioned centre: Clarence Crafoord, mobile: 46(0)73-679 16 89. There is also information in English available on their home page.

We will continue our review with one post for each of the five areas of the EIU:s democracy index. We will also produce summaries and overviews. See links below!

Overviews and summaries:
- Matters of fact and opinion
- A ”near perfect” democracy
- Constitutional illusions in Swedish democracy

The five areas:
- Electoral process and pluralism
- Functioning of government
- Political participation
- Political culture
- Civil liberties

If you have questions, please post a comment, or mail us at ”grundlag” + ”at” + ”gmail.com”.

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